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Lead paint poisoning may be the most pernicious environmen-
tal hazard threatening our nation's children today.1 Federal au-
thorities recently have noted that "[1lead poisoning remains the
most common and societally devastating environmental disease of
young children,"2 demanding "a major societal effort to eliminate
it."3 Over four million children across America may face exposure
to dangerous levels of lead in their homes. 4
Lead paint abatement costs may exceed $2 billion in the Twin
Cities alone. 5 In the past, those who have borne the burden of these
costs have not been the ones responsible for creating the lead paint
menace. Injured victims and their families have primarily ab-
sorbed the burden in the form of medical costs, special education
costs, and lifelong reductions in earnings. Taxpayers have increas-
ingly assumed the financial burden through expanded government
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1. New Fears Arise Over Lead Paint, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 21, 1991
at S6. Exposure often leads to brain damage, coma, and death. AGENCY FOR Toxic
SUBSTANCE AND DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1-2 (1988) [hereinafter NATURE & ExTENT].
2. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING xi (1991)
[hereinafter STRATEGIC PLAN].
3. Dr. William Roper, Director of the Centers for Disease Control, stated, "We
believe that lead poisoning is the No. 1 environmental problem facing America's chil-
dren. Therefore, it will take a major societal effort to eliminate it." Philip J. Hilts,
White House Shuns Key Role on Lead Exposure, N.Y. TIMES, August 25, 1991 at A14.
4. Id. at 1.
5. See TASK FORCE ON LEAD ABATEMENT COSTS, MINNESOTA STATE PLANNING
AGENCY, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE CHILD LEAD PROBLEM IN MINNESOTA 1
(1990) [hereinafter MINN. NATURE & ExTENT]. See also infra § I.
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screening, treatment, and abatement programs.6 Recently how-
ever, a trend has emerged of plaintiffs seeking to hold the lead
paint industry itself responsible for the damage lead poisoning has
caused them.7 Unfortunately, courts across the country have
proven unprepared to resolve lead paint claims.8
This article forges a new framework for resolving lead paint
claims - "market share recovery for risk." This theory of liability
combines the "recovery for risk" theory applied to asbestos cases in
Minnesota with "market-share-based" theories courts have ac-
cepted in DES cases. Instead of relying on parents of injured chil-
dren to sue lead paint manufacturers for compensatory damages,
market share recovery for risk would recognize that lead paint
property contamination is an injury itself and would create a cause
of action for property owners to recover the costs of lead paint re-
moval or abatement from paint manufacturers. Hence, market
share recovery for risk would encourage property owners to take
preventative measures for the benefit of current and future resi-
dents.9 Furthermore, market share recovery for risk suggests a
6. The state and federal reports cited in notes 1, 2, and 5 were specifically pre-
pared to appraise the expected demand for public funding to fight the lead paint
problem.
7. See Hurt v. Philiadelphia Housing, 1992 WL 221992 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27,
1992); Swartzbauer v. Lead Indus. Ass'n Inc., 794 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Pa. 1992); San-
tiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1992); Philadelphia v.
Lead Indus. Assoc., 1992 WL 98482 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1992); LeBlanc v. Sherwin
Williams Co., 551 N.E.2d 30 (Mass. 1990).
8. Claims against lead paint producers have suffered from two major defects
under standard tort law. First, plaintiffs have had difficulty identifying a particular
paint manufacturer as the tortfeasor. Second, even where courts might hold a class
of defendants liable, they have lacked a method for assessing and apportioning dam-
ages. At least three cities along with numerous individuals have sued producers of
lead paint seeking to apply alternative forms of liability to reach paint producers. At
least two commentators expect market share liability to become an accepted tool.
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American
Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332 (1991) "The move to proportionaliza-
tion in the law of torts has an inexorable quaility about it," Henderson and Twerski
write. "[Clourts will be pressed to utilize [probabilistic] information to help resolve
causation issues on a proportional basis." Id., 1338-39. Two states have refused to
adopt market share liability in this context. See Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 194; Hurt
1992 WL 221992; Lead Indus. Assoc. 1992 WL 98482; Swartzbauer 794 F. Supp. at
146. ("Of particular significance" in Santiago, however, "is the fact that defendants
here supplied lead pigment in bulk to paint manufacturers. They are not being sued
as manufacturers or marketers of the allegedly offending paint. They, therefore,
could not control all of the risks that the products may have presented to the public."
Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 195.) These states' primary justification is a firm belief in
the inviolability of long-standing tort doctrine. Hurt at 17 ("the Pennsylvania courts
have rejected them because of... the abandonment of the requirement of proximate
causation"). A claim by the city of New Orleans awaits further action. Gould v.
Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 595 So.2d 1238, 1241 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
9. Unlike other market-share-based theories which only compensate injured
children after they begin suffering the effects of lead poisoning, a contaminated prop-
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method for removing the obstacles to recovery traditional tort doc-
trine presents to lead paint poisoning victims. In modifying the
traditional tort notions of causation and damage apportionment,
market share recovery for risk remains true to the policy goals tort
law was created to effectuate. This theory minimizes the costs of
lead paint to society by directing resources to preventing rather
than remedying harm to children and distributes the costs to those
who are at fault for creating them.
Section I of this article describes how lead paint poisons chil-
dren and considers the costs associated with lead poisoning. Sec-
tion II focuses on property owners as a class of plaintiffs in lead
paint litigation and shows how three different theories of tort liabil-
ity - recovery for risk, market share liability, and risk contribution
theories - alter the causation and damages elements of traditional
tort liability. This section also demonstrates the acceptance of the
recovery for risk theory in Minnesota asbestos cases and the broad
acceptance the market share liability and risk contribution theories
enjoy outside Minnesota. Section III proposes market share recov-
ery for risk theory and contends that it is a plausible theory for
resolving lead paint claims in Minnesota. This section argues that
recovery for risk extends to lead paint hazards and asserts that
Minnesota case law does not preclude the adoption of a market-
share-based liability theory.
I. Background: The Impact and Expense of Lead
Poisoning
Lead poisoning poses a ubiquitous threat to young children.lO
Because the lead exists in paint chips, paint dust, and soil contami-
nated by lead paint, children are at particular risk. Children regu-
larly put their hands and other objects which may carry lead dust
into their mouths, dramatically increasing their chances of lead in-
take and poisoning." Since lead paint presents a widespread and
erty owner's claim based on market share recovery for risk ripens before children
actually get hurt. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
10. The fetus, which lacks any defenses to lead intake, also faces a danger from
lead. NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 1, at 1-2. Lead circulating in a pregnant wo-
man's body, at levels harmless to her, passes through the placenta to the fetus. Id.
at 1-9. Pregnancy and associated physiological stresses release additional lead into
the bloodstream from lead reservoirs in a woman's body. Id. at 1-5. Lead may dam-
age the fetus during its most vulnerable period, resulting in lower birth weights and
relatively earlier births. Id. at 1-7.
11. NATuRE & ExTmNT, supra note 1, at 1-40, VI-49-54. Although the lead in a
child's environment may originate in part from a source other than lead paint, par-
ticularly leaded gasoline, only lead paint is relevant in creating market share recov-
ery for risk because it focuses on assigning liability for creating the risk that the
toxin poses by its very existence in a child's environment. Market share recovery for
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concentrated risk of harm to children, it is not surprising that lead
paint causes most of the severe cases of lead poisoning in the
United States.12 Children who continually ingest contaminated
soil may inadvertently elevate their lead levels well above the ac-
cepted threshold for lead poisoning in four to six months. 13 Pica, a
more severe manifestation of the childhood tendency to put things
in one's mouth, places many children in aggravated danger.14
Regardless of the path lead takes into a body, the developing
bodies of young children absorb lead faster and retain more of it
than do mature bodies. Initially, children's higher metabolism and
risk scenarios do not require that plaintiffs trace personal injuries to precise exclu-
sive medical causes. Id. at 1-40.
12. Id. at VI-54.
In terms of both quantitative impact and persistence of the hazard, as
well as dispersal of the source into the population, leaded paint has
been and remains a major source for childhood exposure and intoxica-
tion.... Following close to leaded paint as a troublesome and persisent
lead source is dust/soil lead .... Gasoline is declining significantly as a
major lead source, particularly since the 1970s when it was adding
about 40-50% to total Pb-B levels in the U.S. population.
Id.
13. A blood lead concentration exceeding 30 ug/g may arise from ingesting
merely one-sixth gram of soil daily. See TASK FORCE ON LEAD ABATEMENT COSTS,
MINNESOTA STATE PLANNING AGENCY, LEAD ABATEMENT SuBsImIEs: REPORT AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS FROM THE TASK FORCE ON LEAD ABATEMENT COSTS 12 (1991) [herein-
after TASK FORCE ON LEAD]. Interior and exterior lead paint decomposes. Paint
chips and paint dust contaminate soil. NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 1 at 1-40.
Studies show a high correlation between lead exterior paint and elevated soil lead
content. See id. at VI-54. Gasoline use introduced additional lead into the air. Re-
search indicates substantial lead originating in gasoline may have settled into soil
along major roadways. MINN. NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 5, at 12. The potential
risk posed by gasoline lead has declined, however, as the phase out of leaded gaso-
line progresses. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 1, at 1-45.
14. Pica describes a tendency to eat non-food objects including soil and paint
chips. Id. Researchers identified pica behavior in 87% of lead-intoxicated toddlers
treated in one program. See Michael W. Shannon, Lead Intoxication in Infancy, 89
PEDIATRICS 87, 87 (1992). Habitual pica may increase a child's soil ingestion to 10-50
times normal. TASK FORCE ON LEAD, supra note 13, at 12. Pica-induced ingestion of
lead paint chips offers the most expedient route to high blood lead levels. "A small
paint chip containing 50% lead ... when ingested by a toddler, will most likely
produce acute poisoning." NATURE & FxTENT, supra note 1, at 1-3. See also Michael
D. McElvaine et. al, Prevalence of Radiographic Evidence of Paint Chip Ingestion
Among Children with Moderate to Severe Lead Poisoning, St. Louis, Missouri, 1989
Through 1990, 89 PEDIATRICS 740, 740-42 (1992). Pica "is generally found among
children who experience some kind of deprivation - either nutritional or emo-
tional," IRWIN H. BILLICK & V. EUGENE GRAY, LEAD BASED PAINT POISONING RE-
SEARCH: REVIEW AND EVALUATION 1971-1977, 71 (1978). Children with pica may
comprise 20-30 percent of inner city children. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEV., COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKABLE PLAN FOR THE ABATEMENT OF LEAD-BASED
PAINT IN PRIVATELY OWNED HOUSING 2.17 (1990). One recent radiograph study
found lead paint chips in 26% of the children examined who suffered from severe
lead poisoning and cautioned that the actual incidence of paint chip ingestion is
probably higher. PEDIATRICS, at 740.
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respiration rates introduce proportionally greater amounts of lead
into their bodies.15 Children, unlike adults, absorb as much as fifty
percent of the lead they ingest.16 Children also retain more of the
lead they absorb.17 A greater fraction of the retained lead remains
in the bloodstream of a child, while adults more efficiently seques-
ter circulating lead in their bones.18
Lead poisoning strikes children of all races and classes, but
the burden ultimately falls unevenly on poor and minority chil-
dren.19 The particular children suffering disproportionately from
lead poisoning - where factors including race, income, urbaniza-
tion, malnutrition, and pica intersect - often must rely on govern-
ment agencies, courts, or legislatures to protect them from
contracting this preventable illness.2 0 Many of these children come
from precisely the economic strata of society least able to secure
adequate prevention, medical care, or compensatory education.21
Families with greater incomes may avoid lead poisoning by abating
their own homes, taking their children for regular screening, and
simply by maintaining their yards and covering exposed soil.
Hence, any proposed solution to the lead poisoning problem must
contain an economic as well as a technical component.
Lead poisoning generates two categories of costs to society.
The first category includes the various costs of treating and com-
pensating lead-poisoned children following diagnosis.2 2 This cate-
gory includes medical costs, special education costs, and lost future
15. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 1, at I-5.
16. Id. at 13. Adults absorb approximately 8 percent of the lead they ingest.
HOwARD W. MIELKE & JOHN L. ADAMs, ENVIRONMENTAL LEAD RISK IN THE TWIN Crr-
ms 1 (1989).
17. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 1, at I-5.
18. Id. at I-5.
19. Id. at 1-47. The NHANES II found Black children in major cities were four
times more likely than White children to be poisoned by lead. MINN. NATURE & Ex-
TENT, supra note 5, at 1. Sixty-two percent of Black children in lower income fami-
lies had unacceptable lead intoxication, compared to seventeen percent for
metropolitan children overall. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 1, at V-13 (Table V-7).
Native American and Hmong Children also face heightened risks of lead poisoning.
See MImLKE, supra note 16, at 2; TASK FORCE ON LEAD, supra note 13, at 7.
20. Nutrition plays a substantial role. "Numerous studies have shown that cal-
cium status and iron status in young children are both inversely related to the level
of lead absorption, that is, as either calcium or iron levels go down, lead levels tend
to go up." NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 1, at 1-31.
21. "Prevalences of elevated Pb-B levels are highest for inner-city, underprivi-
leged Black children, while rates for other strata of city children, both Black and
White, are intermediate. Suburban children above the poverty level have the lowest
prevalences." Id. at 1-47.
22. See MIN. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 5, at 6; NATURE & EXTENT, supra
note 1, at 1-15-16.
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earnings.2 3 The Environmental Protection Agency estimated the
total cost24 of lead poisoning at $16 billion for 1987.25 The com-
bined cost for Minnesota's three largest cities was estimated at
$11.5 to $13.1 million annually. 26
The second category includes the cost of abatement - either
removing the lead pursuant to strict safety guidelines or limiting
the opportunity for exposure to the lead through procedures such as
encapsulation of lead paint and exposed soil.27 This second cate-
gory includes costs for the temporary relocation of residents, regu-
lar sampling and monitoring during cleanup, specialized
equipment, and disposal of the removed substances. 28 The Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development proposed a nationwide
five-year abatement plan at a cost of $974 million.29 In the Twin
Cities, the cost of abating all pre-1950 lead-painted housing could
exceed $2 billion,30 while the cost of abating merely housing with
deteriorated lead paint could exceed $220 million.3 1 These esti-
mates of the costs of lead poisoning reveal the depth of the lead
paint problem and the need for the remedy proposed in this article.
23. TASK FORCE ON LEAD, supra note 13 at 13; MINN. NATURE & ExTENT, supra
note 5, at 4-7. Societal cost figures may underestimate the current cost because the
problem compounds over time, "the count of children at a specific point in time... is
actually multiplied manyfold over an extended period if the exposure source remains
unabated." NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 1, at 1-15.
24. Costs in this context include both established costs such as the cost of hospi-
talization and "monetized social costs" which include less tangible costs such as lost
future earnings which require estimation in current dollars. See MINN. NATURE &
EXTENT, supra note 5, at 6.
25. Id. at 6. The EPA calculated medical and compensatory education costs to-
taled $5.75 billion in 1987, plus "another 10+ billion was lost to the affected children
through reduced future earnings." Id. HUD predicted abatement of all pre-1950
housing would result in avoidance of $62 billion in social costs. STRATEGIC PLAN,
supra note 2, at 12.
26. MINN. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 5, at 6.
27. Id. at 16-17. See generally OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., THE HUD LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT DEM-
ONSTRATION (1991) [hereinafter ABATEMENT DEMONSTRATION]; STRATEGIC PLAN,
supra note 2.
28. See MIN. NATURE & EXTENT, supra note 5, at 16-17. See generally ABATE-
MENT DEMONSTRATION, supra note 27.
29. See generally STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 2.
30. MINN. NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 5, at 17.
31. Id. It may cost another $13 million for landscaping to suppress dust contam-
inated with lead. Id. Minnesota's Task Force on Lead Abatement Costs suggested a




II. Components of a New Approach to Lead Paint
Jurisprudence
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances
in science and technology create fungible goods which may
harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific pro-
ducer. The response of the courts can be either to adhere rig-
idly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such
products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs
... 32
This article focuses on owners of lead-paint-contaminated
property as plaintiffs to suggest a theory to solve the lead paint
problem that is preventative rather than remedial and that shifts
the cost of the lead paint solution to those entities responsible for
creating the problem. Traditionally, it has been parents of lead-
poisoned children who have sued landlords and paint manufactur-
ers to recover damages resulting from personal injury. Although
these suits appropriately have sought to force the responsible par-
ties to compensate the victims of lead paint poisoning, they have
failed to ameliorate the dangers of lead poisoning before actual
harm to children has occurred. In addition, these suits have proven
inadequate since many property owners lack the resources to pay
damages should courts hold them liable to a substantial number of
lead poisoning ictiMs.3 3 In contrast, suits by property owners
against paint manufacturers for abatement costs remove the risk of
lead poisoning so there will be no victims to compensate. Further-
more, suits for abatement that prevent the need for later personal
injury suits by victims will keep the amount of damages collected
from paint manufacturers comparatively low.
Suits by property owners against lead paint manufacturers
currently arise in two ways. First, paint poisoning victims may sue
their landlords seeking monetary compensation for their children's
injuries and removal of the hazard from their homes. 34 Landlords
may then, in turn, implead manufacturers as third parties if they
32. Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980).
33. The Minnesota Task Force on Lead Abatement Costs concluded that a pri-
mary obstacle to lead abatement in Minnesota was that "[nlo funds are available for
property owners to comply with abatement orders when a child with an elevated
blood lead level has been identified." MiNN. NATURE & ExTENT, supra note 5, at 5.
The City of New York sued lead-paint manufacturers after plaintiffs had filed at
least 78 lawsuits against the Housing Authority and the city had spent nearly $25
million to respond to lead-based paint hazards. William G. Krizan & Tom Ichniow-
ski, City Sues Lead Paint Makers, Alleges They Knew of Danger, 222 E.N.R. 14
(1989).
34. See generally Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 186 (D.
Mass. 1991); LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co., 551 N.E.2d 30,31 (Mass. 1990); Hurt
v. Philadelphia Housing, 1992 WL 221992 (E. D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1992).
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were not already joined.3 5 Second, property owners who are forced
to ameliorate lead paint hazards on their property, by state law or
agency determinations for example, may sue paint manufacturers
to recover their abatement expenditures.3 6
As a result, the paint industry has increasingly become the
ultimate target of lead paint litigation.37 For the most part, five
companies constitute the lead paint market.38 Plaintiffs allege
these industry members knew the dangers of lead paint and failed
to warn consumers for decades before Congress forced them to re-
move lead from their products in 1978.39 Property owners who sue
paint manufacturers must prove the manufacturers knew or should
have known of the danger inherent in lead paint used in residences
and that by continuing to market lead paint they breached a duty to
foreseeable victims. Problems arise for property owner plaintiffs
both because the economic loss doctrine stops plaintiffs from stating
a claim in tort for what is really a breach of warranty case and be-
cause the identification element of causation in traditional tort doc-
trine forces plaintiffs to trace the paint on their walls to the
manufacturer who produced it. Thus, before a new theory can suc-
ceed in providing a remedy for the lead paint problem by allowing
property owners to sue paint manufacturers, the theory must
recharacterize the lead paint hazard as a compensable injury, pro-
vide a method for identifying tortfeasors, and then explain how to
apportion damages.
Courts face the problem of whether to impose liability on the
manufacturers of lead paint for the damage collectively but anony-
mously caused by their products. Plaintiffs in lead paint cases gen-
erally join as many manufacturers as possible because they cannot
trace the injurious paint to any one manufacturer. Those courts
which adhere to traditional tort doctrine will dismiss such claims
naming multiple defendants for lack of identification.4O An attempt
to modify traditional tort doctrine to meet the challenges presented
35. See generally Gould v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 595 So.2d 1238, 1238
(La. Ct. App. 1992). The court ordered consolidation of eleven lead paint claims
against the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) and allowed HANO to pro-
ceed against paint manufacturers after HANO filed third party demands against
three paint manufacturers and a trade group in each case.
36. See generally City of New York v. Lead Industries Ass'n, 1991 WL 284454
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). See also, Krizan & Ichniowski, supra note 33, at 14.
37. See, e.g., Andrew Blum, Lead Paint Litigation Mushrooms; "Risk" Expands,
NAT'L LAw J., Nov. 4, 1991, at 3.
38. Neal B. Glick, Lead Paint Liability Continues to Escalate, MASSAcHUsE'rs
LAwYERS WEEKLY, May 11, 1992, at 42.
39. See Santiago, 782 F. Supp. at 188; LeBlanc, 551 N.E.2d at 31-32; Hurt, 1992
WL 221992 at 4. See also NATURE & ExTErr, supra note 1, at VI-10.
40. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Lead Industries, 1992 WL 98482, at *13.
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by fungible products presents two questions: whether existing law
currently recognizes a cause of action to attach liability to a manu-
facturer of lead paint before the paint has caused a personal injury
and whether a state should adopt a nontraditional liability theory
to extend accountability to defendants who cannot be linked di-
rectly to a specific incident of damage and to apportion liability
among all the producers of a defective but fungible product. Thus,
paint manufacturers may be liable to owners of lead-painted prop-
erty if the plaintiffs can: 1) assert a cause of action against the
manufacturers, 2) identify the manufacturers collectively as
tortfeasors; and, 3) explain how to apportion liability among
tortfeasors if a plaintiff successfully attaches liability to a group of
manufacturers.
Tort law erects two potential barriers to claims by owners of
lead-painted property against lead paint manufacturers.41 First,
the economic loss doctrine prevents plaintiffs from recovering dam-
ages for losses that result from unsatisfied commercial expecta-
tions.4 2 Plaintiffs cannot recover "the diminution in the value of
the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for
the general purpose for which it was manufactured and sold."43
Courts generally deny recovery of pecuniary damages unless a com-
pensable injury occurs: a personal injury or damage to property
other than the product itself. An exception to the economic loss doc-
trine permits courts to award damages when the product poses a
serious risk of personal injury by classifying the risk as property
damage. Lead paint does not technically inflict damage on other
property. Therefore, lead paint claims potentially trigger the eco-
nomic loss doctrine as a bar to recovery. Prudent property owners
claiming damages for the latent risk posed by lead paint must then
rely on a court's willingness to recognize this exception to the eco-
nomic loss doctrine.
41. 2 M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14.1-3, at 39-48 (2nd ed. 1988).
See also David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The Unwarranted
Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. Rav. 771, 778-82 (1991) (explaining the
cause in fact doctrine and arguing it should control in DES cases). See generally
Steven Bonanno, Presumed Innocent: Illinois' Rejection of Market Share Liability in
Smith v. Eli Lilly & Company is 'Cause in Fact" to Celebrate, 24 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 869 (1991) (arguing the cause in fact doctrine correctly prevented the use of
market share liability in Illinois).
42. See MADDEN, supra note 41 § 22.21, at 334-37; James L. Connaughton, Com-
ment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age: Asbestos in Schools and the Duty to Abate a
Latent Environmental Hazard, 83 N.W. U. L. REv. 512, 518 (1989). For the Minne-
sota Supreme Court's articulation of the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota, see
Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990); Superwood Corp v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
43. MADDEN, supra note 41, at 334.
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Second, the traditional notion of causation incorporates an
identification requirement which effectively shields untraceable
manufacturers from liability. To prove their case, plaintiffs must
connect their injury to the defendant's conduct by establishing the
two elements of causation: cause-in-fact (defendant's conduct was a
substantial contributing factor in the injury) and proximate cause
(the harm was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defend-
ant's conduct).44 Lead paint victims generally cannot trace the
paint on their walls to a particular defendant and thus are unable
to recover for failure to prove the cause-in-fact element of their
cases.
Three modifications of traditional tort doctrine fit together to
overcome these obstacles to a viable lead paint solution. First, re-
covery for risk theory alters the standard definition of compensable
injury to make the presence of an unreasonable risk of injury an
injury in itself, justifying the imposition of liability. The plaintiff's
requested relief could then be an award of costs to abate the unrea-
sonable risk. Second, market share liability circumvents the stan-
dard tort law notion of causation by shifting to the defendants the
burden of proving that the fungible product did not cause the injury
and then apportioning liability to each defendant based on market
share. Finally, risk contribution theory relies on market share in
assigning liability but goes beyond market share liability to predi-
cate liability on the creation of an unreasonable risk. The change in
emphasis embodied in risk contribution theory provides a theoreti-
cal bridge between the recovery for risk theory and the market
share method of apportioning damages.
A. Recovery for Risk
For a property owner plaintiff to win an abatement case
against a manufacturer, the plaintiff must show that the manufac-
turer breached a duty owed to the plaintiff and that the breach
caused an actual injury. In traditional tort law, manufacturers
have a duty not to market products they know are dangerous and
that they know may require removal, or cause injury, or violate
housing regulations. But because of the economic loss doctrine,
which prevents suits in tort for what is in effect a breach of war-
ranty contract claim, contamination is not an injury-in-fact. Recov-
ery for risk avoids this problem in categorizing damages by shifting
the focus away from personal injury to make unreasonable risk of
personal injury an actual injury to the property owner.
44. See supra § I.C.
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To achieve the necessary shift of focus, recovery for risk theory
redefines the concept of compensable injury. Recovery for risk
removes the emphasis from personal injury and "recognize[s] con-
tamination itself to be an injurious occurrence for which the tor-
tious contaminator should bear the ultimate burden of
alleviating."45 Therefore, under recovery for risk theory the issue of
injury becomes whether the product created an unreasonable risk
of injury which harmed the owner by contaminating the property,
not whether the product has yet made anyone ill.46 Abatement
costs become the actual damages for property owners. 4 7 Recovery
for risk avoids the definitional difficulty of determining whether
harm to property constitutes compensable "property damage," or
noncompensable "economic loss."48 Recovery for risk looks instead
to the risk created and the resulting potential for personal injury as
the true grounds for liability.49 Recovery for risk theory interprets
recent decisions as imposing a common law duty on manufacturers
to abate hazards created by their products.50 This newly recog-
nized duty is derived from the fundamental duty of manufacturers
not to market products posing a substantial and unreasonable risk
of harm.5 1 Courts have already applied this reasoning in asbestos
cases.5 2 The obvious similarities between asbestos and lead paint
cases militate for analogous treatment of lead paint claims.
By recognizing a manufacturer's duty to abate a hazard it gen-
erates, recovery for risk offers a new understanding of existing case
law and a solid policy-based framework for analyzing future
claims.5 3 The theory suggests that in the future courts should look
beyond the constraints of the economic loss doctrine.54 Recovery for
risk theory posits that as society becomes increasingly conscious of
the dangers of toxic contamination, courts should articulate a the-
ory that does not allow those in fact responsible for such contamina-
tion to escape liability through an anomaly in tort doctrine. To
reach this goal, recovery for risk theory alters the traditional notion
of injury but does so only to fulfill the very policies traditional tort
doctrine was created to serve. First, it properly shifts the costs of
remedying injuries to those entities who are at fault for causing
45. Connaughton, supra note 42, at 545.
46. Id. at 513.
47. Id. at 544.
48. Id. at 545.
49. Id. at 536-37.
50. Id. at 530-36.
51. Id. at 513-14.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 545.
54. Id. at 518-36.
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those injuries. Second, it enhances the deterrence function of tort
law by punishing willful or negligent manufacturers for marketing
dangerous products and also by encouraging property owners to
abate lead paint poisoning risks before personal injury results.55
Risk creators cannot hope to escape liability simply because their
tortious conduct failed to cause traceable personal injury. Recovery
for risk also eliminates the discrepancy between an injured party
who may be compensated and a property owner who eliminates the
risk of injury to many potential victims at significant expense but
may not receive compensation under traditional doctrines.56 This
theory recognizes the lack of a moral distinction between the manu-
facturers who supplied the product in either scenario. Finally, re-
covery for risk reduces the costs to all parties. 57  Paint
manufacturers would become liable for easily ascertainable and rel-
atively inexpensive abatement expenses rather than random dam-
age awards. Recovery for risk theory provides a sound foundation
for creating a cause of action for property owners against lead paint
manufacturers.
Minnesota courts recognize the recovery for risk theory. Min-
nesota courts consistently sustain negligence and strict liability ac-
tions in tort against asbestos manufacturers without requiring
antecedent personal injuries.58 The courts have found that asbes-
tos poses an unreasonable risk to all people exposed to it.59 The
costs of asbestos maintenance, removal, and replacement qualify as
damages under Minnesota law.60 The Minnesota Supreme Court
has agreed that these damages accrue due to the risk inherent in
the presence of asbestos, not because any particular person has suf-
fered a health injury.6 1 These damages, however, do not fall into
the category of "economic losses" for which recovery cannot, be
granted.6 2
The mere presence of asbestos in a building in Minnesota cre-
ates an unreasonable risk and thus causes damage.6 3 This damage
55. Id. at 538.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 544.
58. Independent School Dist. Mo. 197 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D.
Minn. 1990). See also 80 S. Eighth St. v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 N.W. 2d 393
(Minn. 1992); T.H.S. Northstar Assoc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 767 F. Supp. 969 (D.
Minn. 1991); Federal Reserve v. Carey-Canada, 1988 WL 220489 (D. Minn. 1988).
59. See 80 S. Eighth St., 486 N.W.2d at 398.
60. For a complete explanation of risk-based damages and abatement actions,
see James L. Connaughton, supra note 42, (cited with approval in 80 South Eighth
Street, 486 N.W.2d at 396).
61. See 80 S. Eighth St. 486 N.W.2d at 397-9.




provides the foundation for a tort claim in negligence or strict liabil-
ity by a property owner.6 4 A manufacturer owes a duty to everyone
who comes within the potential range of the particular harm.65 The
manufacturer breaches its duty to consumers by releasing an un-
reasonably dangerous product into the marketplace. 6 6 This risk
constitutes actual damage because the owner must abate the asbes-
tos to remove the risk and avoid foreseeable personal injuries. 67
The costs of abating the hazard and obviating foreseeable injuries
serves as a measure of damage.6 s
Damage caused by the presence of asbestos does not constitute
economic loss because the harm caused by asbestos does not consti-
tute a failure to meet its bargained-for expectations as fire-retard-
ant insulation. Thus, the economic loss doctrine protecting sellers
in the sale of goods from suits based on a product's failure to meet
expectations does not apply.6 9 Courts generally expect experienced
businesspersons to internalize the assorted risks of economic loss
when negotiating the terms of a transaction.7 0 Claims for economic
losses may proceed under the Uniform Commercial Code or under
warranty law but may not proceed under tort law.71 The economic
damages associated with asbestos, the expense required to remove
it and replace it or to effectively encapsulate it, do not arise out of
the bargained-for function of asbestos. 7 2 Consumers purchase as-
bestos-based materials for their fire-retardant properties. The
health hazard does not diminish the fire-resistant qualities of as-
bestos.7 3 The injury lies in the creation of a risk distinct from the
primary purpose of asbestos. Thus, the property damage was not a
risk implicitly allocated between the parties to a transaction, and a
building owner may recover in tort for damages due to asbestos
contamination. 7 4
B. Market Share Liability
Property owner plaintiffs who have established that a paint
manufacturer has breached a duty owed to them and caused an ac-
64. See id. at 399; T.H.S. North Star, 767 F. Supp. at 973-74.
65. See 80 S. Eighth St., 486 N.W.2d at 399.
66. See id. at 397.
67. Id. at 398.
68. Id. at 399.
69. Id. at 397.
70. 80 S. Eighth St., 486 N.W.2d at 356.
71. Id. at 397; T.H.S. North Star, 767 F. Supp. at 972.
72. 80 S. Eighth St., 486 N.W.2d at 397.
73. T.H.S. North Star, 767 F. Supp. at 973.
74. 80 S. Eighth St., 486 N.W.2d at 399; Independent School District Mo. 197,
V.W.R. Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286, 302 (D. Minn.).
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tual injury will prevail if they can also show that the injury has cost
the plaintiff a compensable amount of damages. In lead paint
cases, however, many plaintiffs may find it problematic to show
causation. Because it is often nearly impossible to trace old paint to
the exact company that produced it, property owners are likely to
be unable to show that any particular defendant paint manufac-
turer caused their injuries. Market share liability theory relieves
plaintiffs from having to identify the exact manufacturer of the of-
fending paint in order to recover.
Courts and commentators first devised market share liability
as an answer to DES litigation in the late 1970s. 75 DES was a ge-
neric drug prescribed to prevent miscarriages prior to 1970, but ul-
timately it caused a rare form of cancer in patients' daughters.7 6
Although more than three hundred companies produced DES, the
products of each company were fungible; each dose contained the
same chemical composition regardless of its source. Thus, existing
tort law denied individual DES victims a remedy because their in-
ability to trace their doses of DES to specific manufacturers meant
that they could not prove that the specific defendant caused their
injury.7 7 Because of the formalistic strictures of conventional tort
causation, DES manufacturers would have escaped liability en-
tirely for the rare type of cancer they most surely caused in DES
victims. In order to avoid this grossly unjust result, courts had to
surmount two problems: relieving the plaintiffs burden of proving
causation and finding a method of apportioning damages.
Market share liability solves the two problems of fungible
toxin cases in the following way.78 First, it removes the plaintiffs
burden of showing traditional causation-in-fact by relaxing the re-
75. See generally Kathy Anne Biehl, Proof of Causation in Multiparty Drug Liti-
gation, 56 TEx. L. REV. 125 (1977); Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 924 (Cal.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The concept of market-share liability first
appeared in a 1977 Texas Law Review article. The author analyzed the inability of
traditional tort law to compensate these deserving plaintiffs and suggested several
liability commensurate with defendants' percentage market shares. The author pro-
posed the use of market shares to shift the burden of proof to the defendants and as a
rationale for apportioning liability based on a suggestion by Dean Page Keaton.
Biehl, supra at 131 n.43. See also Naomi Sheiner, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978) (proposing a similiar theory
based on enterprise liability).
76. For a concise history of DES see David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability In
DES Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 771,
774-78 (1991).
77. Id. at 777-82.
78. Market-share liability also may serve a third function, increasing the viabil-
ity of class action suits as an option by eliminating the barrier posed by the individ-
ual identification requirement. See Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the
DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668, 675 (1981).
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quirement that the plaintiff identify the specific manufacturer of
the dose of toxin that caused the harm. Plaintiffs may instead es-
tablish a prima facie case by showing 1) the product was fungible;
and, 2) the inability to identify the tortfeasor was not attributable
to the plaintiffs own action or inaction.79 This prong of market
share liability then essentially creates a single umbrella defendant
from the individual manufacturers named in the suit to which lia-
bility may attach under established tort doctrine. The court consid-
ers the causation element met because of the probability that the
created aggregate defendant will include the individual company
actually responsible for dispensing the injury-inducing dose to the
plaintiff.8 0 The defendants must cumulatively represent a large
enough share of the relevant market to prove that it is likely that
some member of the group actually caused the individual harm.
The court then shifts the burden to each of the defendants to prove
it did not cause the particular harm to the plaintiff.
The second prong of the market share liability theory follows
from the first. Since, for the purpose of establishing liability, DES
manufacturers are considered to collectively represent a defendant
industry which inflicted harm on the plaintiff, the theory must then
provide a rationale for apportioning liability among individual de-
fendants for the purpose of determining damages. Because market
share liability depends on the presence of a share of the market
sufficient to represent the whole industry and on each market par-
ticipant supplying a percentage of the product at issue, an obvious
method for apportionment would be to attach liability to each de-
fendant according to its share of the market. Courts adopting mar-
ket share liability could then assume that, over time, a
manufacturer's aggregate share of liability will accurately reflect
the actual harm caused by the relative quantity of the fungible
product the manufacturer produced.81 Thus, market share liability
represents the necessary use of judicial artifice for the purpose of
79. Fungible means, "in law, designating goods, as grain, any unit or part of
which can replace another unit, as in discharging a debt; capable of being used in
place of another." WEBSTER'S NEw UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICrIoNARY 742 (1983).
In the context of DES litigation and market share liability, fungible connotes a lack
of distinctive elements. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
80. For example, if the plaintiff joined manufacturers which together produced
51% of the DES in the relevant market there would be a better than 50% probability
that the defendants collectively caused the injury.
81. Under standard tort law, a defendant who actually caused 10% of the inju-
ries would compensate each of its actual victims (10% of the total) in full (100% of
the award) under standard tort law. Under market share liability, the defendant
would instead pay 10% of the awards to 100% of the victims. Each method should
lead to the same ultimate result; a manufacturer who actually caused 10% of the
injuries pays 10% of the total damages awarded.
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altering tort doctrine to reflect the realities of the modem manufac-
ture of fungible toxins.8 2
The California Supreme Court's 1980 adoption of market
share liability in Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories sparked a revolution
in the handling of DES cases.83 South Dakota, Washington, and
Florida have since incorporated market share liability into their
laws.8 4 The California court found the prospect of rendering vic-
tims of DES utterly unable to recover against a drug manufacturer
sufficiently troubling to justify an exception to traditional tort doc-
trine.85 DES plaintiffs generally could not identify the source of the
DES they were given because DES was a widely produced generic
drug without identifying properties.86 Hundreds of independent
manufacturers contributed DES to the market.8 7 In response, the
court shaped a new liability theory it called "market share liabil-
ity."8 8 This new theory relied on manufacturers' percentage shares
of the DES market to circumvent two hurdles posed by existing Cal-
ifornia law.89 First, it shifted the burden of proof of causation to
defendants, relieving plaintiffs of the duty to identify the tortfeasor.
Defendants became presumptively liable and were required to
prove they could not have caused the injury. Second, it apportioned
damages among the defendants based on market share.
Persuasive public policy justifications explicitly underlie
Sindell. The court opened its discussion of market share liability
with three policy statements: 1) "between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury,"
2) "defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury;" and, 3)
82. See Randee S. Parlee, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litiga-
tion: The Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 609, 630 (1982) (arguing
market-share liability defendants will pay the same damages they would if victims
could identify them and sue them directly).
83. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 924.
84. See McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F. Supp. 265 (D. S.D. 1983); Martin v.
Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.
2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
85. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
86. Id.
87. The California Supreme Court found that "[a]t least 200 manufacturers pro-
duced DES." Id. at 935.
88. The phrase was first applied to name the theory by a dissenting Justice. Id.
at 938 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 936-38. The California Supreme Court uses a probability based argu-
ment to support shifting the burden of proof of causation to defendants. The court
notes that the probability that one of the defendants made the actual DES which
caused the injury theoretically matches the aggregate market share of the defend-
ants. The court held the presence of a substantial percentage of the manufacturers
can satisfy the causation requirement. The court then states that apportioning lia-
bility among defendants by market share follows logically from the joinder of a sub-
stantial share of the relevant market. Id.
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"holding [the manufacturer] liable for defects . .. will provide an
incentive to product safety."90 The court went on to explain that
market share liability satisfies fairness standards because, over
time, each manufacturer's liability in DES cases will approximate
the harm their specific products caused.91 The court asserted the
fairness of its solution by emphasizing the limitation of liability to
market share and by contrasting the results under market share
liability to the alternative of leaving plaintiffs without a remedy.92
These underlying policy justifications also provided the basis for
the adoption of market share liability in other states.
California's current market share liability theory incorporates
several guidelines. A plaintiff must be unable to identify the source
of the DES responsible for her injuries through no fault of her
own.93 The plaintiff must join manufacturers cumulatively respon-
sible for a "substantial percentage" of the total DES supply,94
although the court declined to articulate a threshold for meeting
this requirement.95 California ultimately adopted a national mar-
ket as the basis for determining market shares.96 California limits
the liability of any defendant to its share of the DES market.97
Courts may not inflate liability to make up for the absence of manu-
facturers who can not be joined or who no longer exist. 98 Finally,
California allows manufacturers to exculpate themselves by show-
ing they could not have produced the particular DES which caused
the plaintiffs injuries.99
The Washington Supreme Court, in 1984, confronted the DES
dilemma in Martin v. Abbott Laboratories.100 The court found the
Sindell theory attractive but rejected it because of the substantial
90. Id. at 936.
91. Id. at 937-38.
92. See id., at 936-38.
93. Id. at 936. The California Supreme Court implied that it provided this rem-
edy because plaintiffs 1) could not identify the manufacturer; and, 2) this failure to
identify was "through no fault of plaintiff." Id.
94. Id. at 937.
95. Id. The California Supreme Court declined to apply the 75-80% threshold
suggested in the Fordham Comment. Id. The court later determined that 10% was
not a substantial share of the market. See Murphy v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710
P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985).
96. See Christopher J. McGuire, Note, Market-Share Liability After Hymowitz
and Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power, 24 MICH. J.L. REF. 759, 760
(1991).
97. Brown v. Super. Ct. (Abbott Laboratories), 751 P.2d 470, 486 (Cal. 1988)
(resolving ambiguity concerning the type of liability under market share by declar-
ing market share imposes only several liability).
98. Id. at 487. See also Sindell, 607 P.2d at 938.
99. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
100. Martin, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984).
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share threshold and the mistaken understanding that California
would inflate defendants' liability to guarantee plaintiffs a complete
recovery.l 0 1 Martin reflected a belief that DES manufacturers
shared some level of culpability for marketing DES.102 The Wash-
ington court agreed with Sindell that drug companies rather than
injured plaintiffs should absorb or distribute the cost of the in-
juryl03 and responded by creating "market share alternate liabil-
ity."'104 Washington's theory allows plaintiffs to proceed against a
single defendant; it defines the market narrowly; it allows defend-
ants to exculpate themselves by showing they did not participate in
the defined market; and it imposes only several liability.' 0 5 Wash-
ington presumptively assigns an equal share of the total market to
each defendant who may then rebut this presumption and establish
an actual share. If defendants prove they collectively represent less
than the full market, a plaintiff may only recover a percentage of
any judgment equal to the percentage of the market represented by
the defendants.
The Florida Supreme Court began with Washington's market
share alternate liability theory when it shaped its own remedy for
DES plaintiffs.' 0 6 The basic elements of Florida's market share al-
ternate liability parallel those of Washington's theory. Florida re-
quires only one defendant, defines the market narrowly, allows
exculpation, and imposes only several liability.107 The Florida
court interjected three additional guidelines. First, a plaintiff
under Florida law must show she "made a reasonable attempt to
identify the manufacturer responsible for her injury."'l0 Second,
Florida's theory applies only in negligence actions.' 0 9 Finally, de-
101. Id. at 381. The California Supreme Court cleared up this misconception in
its Brown decision expressly limited liability to market share. Brown, 751 P.2d at
485.
102. Martin, 689 P.2d at 382. The Washington Supreme Court recognized the
connection of culpability to risk but did not equate causation to risk creation. Id.
The court rejected the risk contribution theory adopted in Wisconsin. Id. at 377.
103. Id. Washington's Supreme Court noted a manufacturer would either obtain
liability insurance, pay the award itself, or spread the cost to consumers through
pricing. Id.
104. Id. at 381. Plaintiffs under the Washington scheme must satisfy four thresh-
old requirements to proceed: "that the plaintiffs mother took DES; that DES caused
the plaintiff's subsequent injuries; that the defendant produced or marketed the type
of DES taken by plaintiffs mother; and that the defendant's conduct... constituted
a breach of a legally recognized duty to the plaintiff." Id. at 382.
105. Id.






fendants may not implead insolvent or defunct companies to reduce
their presumptive market shares.110
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed market share liabil-
ity in 1985. Bixier v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc."' involved a boy se-
verely burned when his nightshirt explosively caught fire. 112 The
family sued J.C. Penney Co. and the store's primary supplier of cot-
ton flannelette. 113 Although the two original parties settled, Bixler
never successfully identified the actual manufacturer of the flam-
mable fabric and later moved to add four additional suppliers of cot-
ton flannelette to the complaint."l 4 The district court denied the
motion and the supreme court affirmed the denial.11 Judge
Sedgewick of the trial court, however, described market share lia-
bility as, "a product liability theory not yet adopted in this state...
[and] inappropriate in this case," 116 and the supreme court held
that, "any consideration of the issue of market share liability is pre-
mature."117 The supreme court also stated, "[w]e express no opin-
ion as to whether we would adopt such a rule, particularly where
the product involved is not entirely fungible with similar products
on the market.""l8
The Minnesota Supreme Court found the cotton flannelette
central to Bixier was not a fungible product as required under the
market share theory."19 Several manufacturers produced similar
products, but each had distinguishing fabric weaves, distinct pat-
terns, and different properties. 120 One manufacturer demonstrated
during discovery that it did not produce fabric with the same thread
density and edge structure as fabric recovered from Bixler's night-
shirt.12 1 Some manufacturers maintained complete pattern librar-
110. Id. Defendants may generally lower their potential liability by impleading
additional defendants, but the court sought to prevent the inclusion of defunct or
insolvent companies as a device to further lower presumptive market shares. Id.
111. 376 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 1985).
112. Id. at 211.
113. Id. at 211-12.
114. Id. at 212.
115. Id.
116. Bixier, 376 N.W.2d at 212. The district court order included a memorandum
opinion which asserted, "[n]o compelling reason exists here, as opposed to circum-
stances in cases cited by plaintiff, where courts have permitted the market share
theory, to shift the burden to the manufacturers." Sedgewick Order, July 27, 1982 at
2, Bider, 376 N.W.2d at 209 (No. 769246).
117. Id. at 214.
118. Id. at 214 n.1.
119. Id.
120. For a review of background facts in Bixler, see Bixler v. Avondale Mills, 405
N.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
121. Id. at 430.
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ies wherein Bixler could not find a match.122 The facts failed to
support the assertion that more than one manufacturer placed de-
fectively flammable flannel on the market because numerous fac-
tors could affect flammability. 123
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, on subsequent review, fur-
ther distinguished the above scenario from successful market share
claims.124 The court found the inability to identify a tortfeasor re-
sulted partially from Bixler's own inaction, not due to circum-
stances beyond Bixler's control as required under the market share
theory.125 The court stated "that the 11-year delay between the ac-
cident and the suit exacerbated the difficulty of discovering the
manufacturer of the fabric."126 Had Bixler acted in a timely fash-
ion, he may have identified the fabric's source. Although market
share liability was not available to Bixler, Minnesota case law does
not preclude the use of market share liability to resolve a claim
which does not succumb to the criticisms leveled at Bixler by the
Minnesota courts.
C. Risk Contribution
Risk contribution theory serves the same essential functions
as market share liability: it attaches liability to manufacturers of
fungible products which have inflicted personal injury and appor-
tions damages among the manufacturers according to percentage of
market share. But, risk contribution achieves these ends by chang-
ing the basis of liability altogether, whereas, market share liability
merely constructs a credible exception to standard tort doctrine.
Risk contribution presumes the existence of "a substantial, identifi-
able, identical, and.., mathematically divisible aggregate risk"127
it, like recovery for risk, relies on the premise that the creation of
an unreasonable risk of injury is culpable behavior. Risk contribu-
tion theory, however, stops short of embracing the redefinition of
compensable injury which is fundamental to recovery for risk the-
ory, so it does not treat the risk of injury as an injury per se. Risk
contribution theory then presumes that percentage market shares
represent the portion of the overall risk each manufacturer creates
122. Id.
123. Id. at 431.
124. Id.
125. Avondale Mills, 405 N.W.2d at 431.
126. Id.
127. Andrew G. Celli, Jr., Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to Tortfeasor
Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 635, 651 (1990) (cit-
ing Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES
Cases, 68 VA_ L. Rv. 713, 751 (1982)).
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for each consumer. It equates liability with the creation of an un-
reasonable risk to all consumers equally, not with the probability
that a manufacturer injured any particular plaintiff.
Risk contribution theory satisfies the policy expectations of
tort law more effectively than market share liability. Costs are
taken from their most concentrated point, the impact on a single
victim, and dispersed to the greatest extent practicable, to everyone
who augmented the risk. Risk contribution offers a fair solution.
The theory treats all defendants equally based on their "creation of
a risk that society deems unreasonable, not whether anyone was
injured by it."128 Tortfeasors will not escape responsibility in a lia-
bility lottery by gambling that no one will be injured by their unrea-
sonably dangerous product or that injured parties will fail to
identify them as the source of the product. Finally, risk contribu-
tion deters future harm by focusing on the risk-creating conduct it-
self, not the individual incidence of personal injury. Risk
contribution facilitates preemptive claims preventing aggravated
harm later on. Under this theory, owners of property containing
lead paint could bring an action for abatement before the lead
harmed children.
The elements of risk contribution theory flow logically from
the theory itself. Risk contribution assumes a national market be-
cause it assesses a defendant's risk creation to consumers at large.
However, it allows plaintiffs to proceed against a single defendant
because that defendant's risk-creating activities directly represent
individual culpability. Further, it imposes only several liability be-
cause of the independence of each actor's risk-creating activity.
Risk contribution does not allow exculpation unless the manufac-
turer was entirely absent from the national market during the rele-
vant time period.
In 1984, Wisconsin became the first state to expand the role of
market share percentages in DES cases beyond merely represent-
ing the probability a manufacturer caused a plaintiffs injury. Wis-
consin formulated a risk contribution theory and became the first
state to truly link culpability to risk creation.129 New York and Ha-
waii have followed Wisconsin's lead and fashioned theories explic-
itly imposing liability for the creation of a risk to society.130
Wisconsin's supreme court relied in part on an article authored by
128. Robinson, supra note 127, at 739.
129. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826
(1984).
130. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989); Smith
v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
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Professor Oscar Robinson concerning risk contributionl3' to shift
the foundation of liability to "relative fault" using Wisconsin's com-
parative negligence doctrine.1 32 Relative fault depends on "the per-
centage of causal negligence attributable to each defendant."l33 In
relative fault, market share percentage emerges as one of seven fac-
tors in determining culpability.134 The analysis begins by recogniz-
ing a manufacturer's duty to ensure the reasonable safety of its
products' 3 5 and the need to fashion adequate remedies for injured
plaintiffs left uncompensated under traditional tort law.136
Although this scheme may assign liability to some innocent defend-
ants, "[Wisconsin] accept[s] this as the price the defendants, and
perhaps ultimately society, must pay to provide the plaintiff an ade-
quate remedy under the law."13 7 Plaintiffs alleging negligence or
strict products liability under Wisconsin law may proceed against
one or more defendants.13 8 Wisconsin defines the market narrowly,
allows defendants to exculpate themselves, and applies a compara-
tive negligence analysis to apportion damages.13 9
The New York Court of Appeals cast aside all previous incar-
nations of market share liability and risk contribution theory in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, by connecting market share to risk and
equating risk with culpability.140 Hymowitz embodied a choice "to
apportion liability so as to correspond to the over-all culpability of
each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of injury each de-
fendant created to the public-at-large.., not causation in a single
case."141 The theory delineated by the court of appeals was as fol-
lows: national market shares indicate defendants' overall risk crea-
tion;14 2 exculpation is unavailable because the link from a
manufacturer's product to a victim is irrelevant to overall risk crea-
131. Robinson, supra note 127 at 140 ; see supra § II.B.
132. See Collins, 372 N.W.2d at 49-53.
133. Id.
134. For a list of the seven factors Wisconsin uses to apportion liability, see id.
135. Id. at 52.
136. Id. at 45. The Wisconsin Supreme Court finds authority in the state consti-
tution to fashion new remedies for injured persons entitled to a legal remedy. Id.
(citing Wisc. CowsT. art. I, § 9).
137. Id. at 52. The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly recognized that damages
assessed to a manufacturer may be passed on to consumers as a business expense.
Id. at 49.
138. Plaintiffs in Wisconsin must first meet four criteria which match those
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
139. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 48-53.
140. See Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076-78 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).




tion;143 only several liability applies; and, liability shall not inflate
to guarantee plaintiffs' full recoveries. 144 The court anchored
Hymowitz on risk because, unlike the Sindell court, it refused to
rely on the likelihood that liability will reflect actual causation over
time.145 The Hymowitz court defined the market nationally be-
cause variations of market share liability which reject a nationwide
market engender disparate results among states, undermining the
anticipated congruence of liability and actual causation in each
state.146 Hymowitz also disposed of Wisconsin's approach, refusing
to accept that national market share could represent the risk actu-
ally posed to a particular plaintiff.147
The Hawaii Supreme Court, resolving a claim against blood
product manufacturers,148 adopted New York's risk contribution
theory in 1991.149 Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc. held "culpability
for marketing the product is a better policy" after considering
Sindell's market share liability as well as the risk contribution ap-
proach articulated in Hymowitz.150 The court divided its opinion
into three parts. First, Smith defined the appropriate market as
the national market.' 5 ' Next, Smith held defendants would only be
severally liable.IS2 The court declined to require plaintiffs to join
more than a single defendant but did urge plaintiffs to do so be-
cause defendants' shares would not be inflated to compensate for
absent manufacturers.153 Finally, Smith followed Hymowitz in de-
clining to allow exculpation, based on the theory that culpability for
risk creation does not require a substantiated link between the
manufacturer and any particular plaintiff. 54
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078.
146. Id. at 1077-78. Results will vary across states under a national assignment
of market shares because a company's actual share in one state may be less than its
national percentage, while its actual share in another state may be greater than its
national percentage. Thus, a company may pay less than its local share in one state,
but more in another. If all states adopted national market shares, liability would
ulimately balance out, matching each defendant's overall (national) market
participation.
147. Id.
148. Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 717 (Haw. 1991). The defend-
ants in Cutter marketed fungible blood coagulation products to hemophiliacs. The
plaintiff, a hemophiliac, allegedly contracted AIDS after exposure to the virus
through the blood products. Id. at 721.
149. See id. at 728.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 729.
153. Smith, 823 P.2d at 729.
154. Id. The court in Smith noted that an exception exists for defendants that
had no relevant product on the market at the time of injury. Id.
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Minnesota courts have not taken a position on risk contribu-
tion. In the Bixler case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
market share liability did not apply but expressly left open the pos-
sibility of adopting a market share liability theory in the future if a
case arose which merited it. Presumably, since current Minnesota
law accepts the recovery for risk theory which focuses on risk creat-
ing behavior, it would require only a small additional step for a
Minnesota court to apply the risk contribution theory in resolving a
case.
HI. The Market Share Recovery for Risk Proposal
The modem law extrapolates from small number to large
number situations in a mechanical way that is largely insensi-
tive to the problems of scale and which neglects the importance
of transaction costs. 155
Minnesota courts should fashion a market share recovery for
risk cause of action for owners of lead-contaminated property to use
in suits to recover abatement costs from paint manufacturers. Lead
abatement claims under market share recovery for risk would pro-
ceed initially under the recovery for risk theory because the pres-
ence of lead paint creates a risk comparable to the risk asbestos
creates. However, lead paint claims also involve identification
problems analogous to those encountered in DES cases. This dis-
tinguishes lead paint claims from asbestos claims making an addi-
tional step necessary. The second stage of a market share recovery
for risk action would overcome the identification problem and im-
pose liability by using market share as was done in DES litiga-
tion.' 5 6 In formulating a new theory, courts should draw from the
application of recovery for risk in recent Minnesota asbestos litiga-
tion and from the various market-share-based theories developed in
other states. This new theory should base culpability for risk crea-
tion on actual and constructive estimations of manufacturers' na-
tional market share, should impose only several liability, and
155. Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEo. L.J.
1377, 1378 (1985).
156. See discussion infra note 76 and accompanying text. The asbestos cases
share a prerequisite. The Minnesota Legislature passed a revival statute circum-
venting a possible time bar posed by the statute of limitations. New York passed a
similar revival statute to permit the pursuit of DES claims. This article declines to
examine the precise implications of the statute of limitations. Lead paint litigation
may require similar initial legislation. This requires experience with actual lead
paint cases, and judicial evaluation of the accrual of causes of action and the rele-
vant applications of Minnesota Statutes. This should not serve as a deterrent to
litigation, however, since the Minnesota legislature has demonstrated deep concern
over the lead paint problem and has shown a willingness to clear a path for meritori-
ous litigation in the past.
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should allow plaintiffs to sue one or more manufacturers of a fungi-
ble product in a single action. Market share recovery for risk the-
ory should not allow defendants to seek exculpation by attempting
to disprove the link between the product and the damages based on
traditional notions of causation-in-fact.
Lead paint poisoning raises challenges to traditional tort doc-
trine analogous to those raised in the DES cases. Lead paint plain-
tiffs, like DES plaintiffs, will have trouble identifying the specific
manufacturer of the paint on the walls of their properties because
paint, once applied, cannot be traced to its source - especially
when multiple layers of paint have accumulated over several de-
cades.' 5 7 Plaintiffs generally have not lost their credibility due to a
time lapse in filing suits. Lead paint continues to strike new vic-
tims every day, giving rise to fresh claims. Market-share-based lia-
bility theories stand to operate at least as effectively in lead paint
cases as they have in DES cases. Market share liability and risk
contribution worked to apportion damages in DES cases that in-
volved hundreds of manufacturers. The task of assigning liability
in lead paint cases through market share liability theory presents a
much smaller administrative challenge because the industry was
essentially comprised of five companies.' 5 8
Whether addressing DES or lead paint claims, five practical
issues arise in implementing a market-share-based liability theory.
First, courts must define the relevant market. Market share could
be determined locally, within a particular state, or nationally. Sec-
ond, courts must decide whether to impose a minimum joinder re-
quirement on plaintiffs initiating suits under market share
liability. Suits could proceed against a single defendant represent-
ing a small share of the market, or courts could require plaintiffs to
join a specified percentage of the overall market before proceeding.
Third, courts must decide whether they should hold defendants
jointly and severally liable or whether defendants should only be
severally liable. The kind of liability to which defendants are sub-
jected may work to prevent plaintiffs from recovering the full
amount of their judgments. Fourth, courts must similarly decide
how to presumptively assign market shares in the absence of com-
plete information and whether to inflate the liability of defendants
with unascertained shares to provide a full recovery. Fifth, courts
157. Paint manufacturers sought dismissal of a suit brought by the Housing Au-
thority of New Orleans (HANO) because after four years and voluminous discovery
HANO could not trace the paint in each apartment to the specific producer, and "will
never be able to prove this fact." Gould v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 595 So.2d
1238, 1242 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
158. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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must develop standards for exculpating defendants claiming they
could not have caused the plaintiffs injury.
A discussion of the optimal formulation of market share recov-
ery for risk requires the incorporation of an economic analysis of
prior market-share-based theories. Two types of costs arise in ap-
plying these theories. Administrative costs to society include all
costs of the litigation itself. Complex litigation results in a substan-
tial expenditure of public money on judicial resources. Error costs
include the cost of a plaintiff failing to recover some or all of the
damages sustained and the cost of forcing a defendant to compen-
sate for damages it objectively did not create. Excess administra-
tive and error costs accrue primarily from defining a narrow
market, imposing joint liability to ensure a full recovery for the
plaintiff, and permitting additional proceedings to consider excul-
pation. The market share recovery for risk theory proposed in this
article minimizes these costs.
National market share is the proper basis for apportionment.
A narrower definition of the relevant market would unduly encum-
ber the discovery process and may produce anomalies in the ulti-
mate nationwide apportionment of liability. An assessment of
national market shares would require establishing only once the to-
tal quantity of lead-based paint disseminated by a defendant. On
the other hand, determinations of local market shares would neces-
sitate never-ending inquiries into the precise distribution of defend-
ants' products in each relevant market however defined and
constrained in an individual case. A court must also arrive at a
method for initially allotting presumptive shares and then imple-
ment a mechanism for calibrating shares reflecting information ad-
duced in the proceedings.
Several liability in market share recovery for risk cases is a
superior method of liability assignment to joint and several liabil-
ity. Several liability is implicit in a risk-based theory because it
limits each defendant's liability to the actual amount of risk it
caused and at the same time reduces the potential error costs
(EC).159 Under a probability-based theory courts can choose to hold
defendants either severally or jointly and severally liable. Even in
the probability-based framework, though, opting for several liabil-
ity reduces error costs. Probability-based theories rely on the likeli-
hood that one of the liable defendants caused a plaintiff's entire
harm. As a result, under a probability-based system with joint and
159. In this discussion the variable "EC" represents one mathematical unit of er-
ror cost. For the purpose of evaluating the correct assignment of liability EC would
be based on the total amount of damages.
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several liability, a guilty-in-fact defendant may mistakenly avoid
paying any damages (an error cost of 1 * EC because that defendant
should have paid the entire award), while another defendant found
jointly liable bears an equivalent error cost due to the misplaced
liability (also an error cost of 1 * EC because this defendant then
pays the entire award). The total error cost in this worst case adds
up to 2 * EC, in effect making an innocent-in-fact defendant act as a
de facto insurer for the industry.160
In contrast, several liability in a probability-based framework
reduces potential error costs to 1 * EC.161 It achieves this reduction
because if a court excuses a defendant from liability, it cannot in-
flate the remaining defendants' liability to guarantee a full recovery
to the plaintiff. Several liability therefore declines to make each
manufacturer a de facto insurer. When the basis for liability
changes to risk, these error costs are reduced to zero because each
defendant pays for the risk it created and liability no longer de-
pends on which defendant's product actually caused the personal
injury. In a risk-based framework, a defendant can be absolved of
liability only if it did not create any risk. However, the removal of a
defendant in these circumstances would not produce error costs be-
cause the liability would be correctly reallocated to the remaining
defendants who did contribute to the risk. Thus, several liability as
part of a risk-based framework eliminates the potential for error
costs to accrue due to misplaced liability.
Market share recovery for risk should facilitate claims against
a single manufacturer as well as allow a plaintiff to sue more than
one manufacturer. Exclusive several liability shields a manufac-
turer from inflated liability as a sole defendant. The plaintiff
clearly will have an incentive to include as many manufacturers as
possible in the original suit because in any given suit the plaintiff
may only recover damages equivalent to the percentage of the mar-
ket represented by the defendants. Also, the manufacturer will un-
doubtedly implead additional manufacturers where it determines it
appropriate to do so. The manufacturer can shift some of the bur-
den of production to fellow manufacturers to delineate the break-
down of market shares where it cannot adequately demonstrate its
own market share. In this situation, if the defendant declines to
160. An innocent manufacturer becomes a de facto insurer to the industry when it
is forced to pay a damage award under joint-and-several liability for an injury which
it did not in fact cause.
161. A guilty-in-fact defendant may pay only 10% of its true liability if it held a
10% market share. In this case, other "innocent-in-fact" defendants would contrib-
ute the remaining 90% to reach 100%. This, however, only yields an error cost of
0.90 * EC, less than 1 EC.
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implead other manufacturers, it may expose itself to excess liability
and generate error costs because of its inability to demonstrate the
actual scope of its risk creation. 16 2 Alternatively, if the manufac-
turer can prove it occupied only a small share of the market, it may
choose to settle the claim without going to trial, or to rely on the
several liability limitation to provide a fair resolution, thus avoid-
ing costs for the use of judicial resources. In this fashion, defendant
manufacturers will select optimal allocations of administrative
costs in each case based on the specifics of the situation and implicit
assessments of the potential error costs pertinent to them.
Liability predicated on risk precludes exculpation unless a
manufacturer can prove it did not sell any lead paint. Where liabil-
ity depends on risk creation, introducing any lead paint into the
national market is sufficient to inculpate a defendant because the
mere introduction of lead paint into the market is the behavior that
creates the risk of harm. Proof that the defendant did not produce
the actual paint on the plaintiffs property thus becomes irrelevant
to the question of liability. Hence, where a plaintiff proves that a
manufacturer did introduce lead paint into the national market, de-
fendants will not be able to defend by showing that their products
were not marketed in the plaintiffs geographical area or that the
defendant never sold to the plaintiffs supplier. By rendering de-
tailed, technical exculpation evidence irrelevant to the issue of lia-
bility, market share recovery for risk significantly lowers litigation
costs. Moreover, precluding exculpation avoids error costs over
time because when a manufacturer is allowed to avoid liability on
any grounds other than non-participation in the market, either the
plaintiff fails to recover a percentage matching the manufacturer's
market share, or the remaining defendants make up the difference
by paying a larger share. Therefore, market share recovery for risk
ensures that plaintiffs receive their due recoveries and that defend-
ants pay their fair shares while also maximizing the administrative
efficiency of lead paint litigation
Conclusion
Manufacturers of injurious products must not attain "safety in
the anonymity of numbers." Lead paint injures children as the
paint deteriorates and children ingest paint dust or paint chips.
162. This theory assumes that courts must assign some presumptive market
share to defendants before they prove their actual share. Error costs could arise if
the presumptive share was larger than the actual share but the defendant failed to
demonstrate its actual market share. Impleading other manufacturers would re-
quire them to also prove their market shares, thus limiting the remaining market
share which the court could presumptively assign to the first defendant.
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Previous solutions have failed to remove the lead paint threat. The
most beneficial solution is to allow property owners to sue paint
companies who placed a dangerous fungible product on the market.
The goal of a suit by a property owner is to diffuse the hazard once
and for all, before tenants suffer irreversible harm. Market share
recovery for risk combines recovery for risk and market-share-
based liability theories to provide a mechanism for identification of
lead paint manufacturers as tortfeasors and for apportionment of
liability. Market share recovery for risk builds on existing Minne-
sota case law incorporating economic and public policy concerns to
hold lead paint producers liable for the harm caused by their prod-
ucts, while also minimizing administrative and error costs associ-
ated with the proceedings. This approach provides a remedy to
deserving plaintiffs but does not impose an unwieldy new form of
haphazard insurance on manufacturers. Market share recovery for
risk respects the need for judicial economy but recognizes the re-
sponsibility of the law to evolve congruently with an increasingly
complex world. Finally, this theory offers a solution to the intracta-
ble public policy predicament posed by lead paint poisoning.
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